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Approaches to Measuring Consumer Benefits
from Food Safety
Eileen O. van Ravenswaay and John P. Hoehn1
The main objective of the paper is to identify important considerations in estimating consumer
benefits of food safety.  We develop a model of consumer response to food contamination problems that
includes four different types of responses:  product avoidance, brand switching, averting behavior, and
mitigation.  We show how these responses are affected by consumers’ knowledge of marginal product
contamination, the effect of averting on marginal product contamination, the health effects of total
exposure to contaminants, and the mitigation expense associated with these health effects.  We develop
implications for benefit estimation and empirical methods.
The paper concentrates on consumer benefits because food consumers are clearly one of the largest
groups of intended beneficiaries of food safety policies.  However, it is important to understand that
consumer benefits are not synonymous with social benefits.  What consumers may be willing to pay for
food safety policies is not the same as what they might be willing to pay in their role as a citizen,
producer, or investor.  These roles bring additional concerns such as reducing social health care costs;
protecting vulnerable, poor, or uneducated segments of the population; reducing liability; and main-
taining competitiveness in domestic and export markets.
Section one identifies several problems that are unique to estimating benefits of product safety,
regardless of the empirical method used.  Section two describes the model.  Section three develops impli-
cations for estimating the benefits of several types of  food safety policies.  Section four describes some
of the implications for empirical methods for measuring consumer benefits.  The final section sum-
marizes major themes.
Special Problems in Estimating the Product Safety Benefits
One of the major challenges in estimating food safety benefits is imperfect information.  Food safety
problems occur because consumers are unable to observe food contamination or learn about it through
experience.  In some cases, even if able to observe, they may not possess adequate information to be able
to judge the severity, duration, and cost of the health effects associated with exposure to the contaminant.
The rationale for government regulation is that experts can acquire the relevant information and make
policy decisions on consumers’ behalf.  The role of benefit estimation is to help the experts assess what
policy consumers would prefer if they were as knowledgeable as experts.  In other words, we seek the
value consumers would place on the safety improvement if they were fully informed of the nature of that
improvement.
There are essentially two strategies we can take to achieve this objective.  One is to observe the
tradeoffs consumers actually think they are making about risk reduction and then infer how they would210
act if faced with the tradeoff experts face.  The other is to attempt to inform a sample of consumers and
observe the choice they make.  The problem with the latter strategy is that we can never supply the full
set of information.  We may be able to see how information changes choices, but we can never provide
subjects with the same level of expertise that decision-makers possess.
Thus, a second challenge of benefit estimation is to be able to predict what real, albeit uninformed,
consumers would do under various policy scenarios.  This task is crucial to accurately inferring what
empirical measures of benefits reveal about how consumers would value policy change if they had expert
information.  For example, suppose contingent valuation methods were used to develop a measure of
consumer willingness to pay for a food safety improvement.  Respondents’ perceptions of the policy
scenario and its consequences will influence their valuation.  When these perceptions depart from how
an informed expert would evaluate the scenario, these differences must be controlled for by careful
design of data collection instruments or by accounting for these differences in estimating statistical
models.  The same is true for any benefit measures based on actual consumer choices, such as hedonic
or travel cost estimates.
A third challenge is evaluating the benefits of policies that seek to inform consumers rather than
reduce hazard exposure.  The problem is determining what type of information is being given, the extent
to which it is actually received, and if so, how it changes consumer knowledge.  Examples of such
policies include labeling, public announcements, and educational programs.  Each of these policy options
affects consumers’ choices differently.  Product labels may affect how much of a product is consumed
(e.g., reduced fish consumption), which brands are bought (e.g., organic), and how products are used
(e.g., cleaning or cooking methods).  These choices affect subsequent use of medical services to alleviate
illness.  Thus, benefit estimation should account for different ways consumers respond to information.
The Model
Consumers may respond to food contamination problems in at least four ways.  They include product
avoidance (Choi and Jensen 1991, Eom 1994, Falconi and Roe 1991, van Ravenswaay and Hoehn
1991b, Weaver 1995), brand-switching (Choi and Jensen 1991, Hammitt 1993, van Ravenswaay and
Hoehn 1991a, Weaver 1995), averting (Eom 1995, Weaver 1995), and mitigating actions (Weaver
1995).  Product avoidance eliminates exposure to contaminants.  Brand-switching may eliminate or
reduce exposure by selection of a similar product which differs in the amount of the contaminant and,
possibly, related quality factors (e.g., pest damage).  Averting actions reduce food contaminants in
products by methods such as thorough cooking, proper storage, and sanitation.  Mitigation involves
treatment of  illness from food contaminants.
Each of these possible consumer responses to food contamination depends on consumers’ percep-
tions of several factors.  First, consumers have some perception of marginal product contamination
levels.  For example, consumers may or may not be aware that poultry may contain Salmonella.  Second,
consumers have some perception of the effect of averting on marginal product contamination levels.  For
example, consumers may or may not be aware that Salmonella may be killed by thorough cooking.
Third, consumers have some perception of the health effect of total exposure to the contaminant.  For
example, consumers may or may not be aware of the health consequences of salmonellosis given their
age and health status.  Fourth, consumers have some perception of the possibility and cost of mitigating
these health effects.  For example, consumers may or may not be aware of whether salmonellosis is
reversible and what medical treatments are required for a cure.
A model incorporating these features has been developed by van Ravenswaay and Hoehn (1996).
They use a two period expected utility Lancaster model where the consumer makes product avoidance,
brand-switching, and averting choices in period one and experiences health consequences and chooses





In the first period, the individual earns income, y, consumes market goods, q = (q ,...,q ), and saves 1J
s for second period expenditures.  The market goods include food brands and averting inputs used to
reduce exposure to contaminants in food brands.  The j  market good has a vector of perceived attributes th
(a ,...,a ).  The total amount of the i  attribute that the consumer perceived to be consumed as a result 1j IJ
th
of purchasing q  units of the j  market good is a  q .  The total amount of the i  attribute perceived to ji j j
th th
be consumed from the purchase of all J goods is:
(1) .
The perceived level of marginal contamination in the j  good is a .  The perception of the total th
ij
contamination in q  units of the j  good is a q .  When fully informed, the consumer is able to observe jI j j
th
exactly how food brands vary in terms of the marginal product characteristic.  She may calculate how
her total exposure to a food contaminant varies with brand selection.  When not fully informed, she
makes a different calculation.
Let A represent the vector A = (A ,...,A,...,A ), where perception of total exposure to a contaminant 1iI
is represented by A.  Perception of total exposure has no effect on utility in the first period, but on health I
consequences in the second period.  First period utility is:
(2) u   =  u (A ,...,A ). 1 1 1 I-1
If the consumer perceives that she may avert exposure to contamination, she will have some expec-
tation about the proportion of the marginal product contamination level that can be removed before
consumption of a food, q .  We represent this removal process as r(q), where 0 # r(q) # 1 and q are j
market inputs such as soap and water.  Thus, perceived total exposure after averting and food con-
sumption is:
(3) A N = A  [1 - r(q)]. II
In the second period, the individual consumes savings from the first period, experiences a health
status (h), and a perceived probability of survival, B, which is a function of perceived health status
expressed as B(h).  Second period utility is:
(4) u  = u (h,s)B(h). 22
The individual has some perception of how health status depends on consumption and averting in
the first period as well as mitigation (m) undertaken in the second period.  Thus, h = h(A N, m).   Substi- I
tuting into (4), the second period problem is to maximize second period utility,
(5) u  = u (h(A N, m), s - m)B(h(A N, m)), 22 I I
by selecting m where A N and s are fixed by actions in the first period.  Solving the maximization prob- I
lem yields m  and an indirect utility function: *
(6) u  = v (h(A N, m ), s - m )B(h(A N, m )). 22  I I
** *
The first period maximization problem is:
(7) max u (A ,...,A ) + v (h(A N, m ), s - m )B(h(A N, m )) 1 1 I-1 2 I I
** *212
s.t. y = s + pq
A N = A [1 - r(q)] II
by selecting q and s, where p = (p ,...,p ) are the prices of the market goods.  Solving (7) and expressing 1J
it in terms of indirect utility yields:
(8) u = v (A,y,p) + v (h(A N, m ), s - m )B(h(A N, m )). 12  I I
** *
Implications for Benefit Estimation
Suppose that a food safety policy reduced the marginal product contamination level on food j.  If the
consumer was fully informed of the pre- and post-policy levels of contamination, the level of compen-
sation that offsets a small change da  is obtained by totally differentiating (8) conditional on the level Ij
of averting (1 - r ) and product avoidance and brand-switching (q ): **
j
(9) dy/da  =  - [(Mv/ Mh)(Mh/MA N)q (1 - r )B]/(Mv/ My) Ij 2 I j 1
**
- [v (MB/Mh)(Mh/MA N)q (1 - r )]/(Mv/ My) 2I j 1
**
The first term on the right-hand side of (9) represents the morbidity effect of a small exogenous change
in marginal product contamination.  The second term is the mortality impact.  Note that these effects
depend on chosen levels of avoiding and averting.
However, in the real world, the consumer was probably unaware that any contamination was ever
present.  In this case, she has been making product avoidance and averting errors, and without the new
policy she might continue to do so.  We underscore the word might because this seems a rather unreal-
istic scenario given press coverage of new discoveries of food contamination.  But assuming she remains
unaware, without the policy she will act as if there is no contamination in period one, but in period two
she will experience unanticipated health effects and mitigation expenses.  The level of compensation that
offsets the disutility from the additional health effects and mitigation measures the value of avoiding the
errors.
A more likely scenario, however, is that the consumer would undertake avoiding and averting
activities.  However, it is also unlikely that the government would not act on the problem in some other
manner since legally it must.  So let us consider the other possible alternatives.
Suppose that the food safety policy provided information about averting methods that could elimi-
nate contamination in a food.  If the information is received by the consumer, this information may
change the perception of the removal process from r(q) to rN(q).  If the new removal process is not fully
comprehended by the consumer, however, she will continue to make errors as described above.  In this
case, the change in perception of the removal process may be characterized by a learning function (Eom
1995).  If the consumer makes no intentional errors, the value of the information would be the amount
of compensation that equates two-period utility with r(q) to utility with rN(q).  If errors are made, how-
ever, the information value declines by the disutility from unanticipated health effects and mitigation
expenses.
Alternatively, suppose that the food safety policy required products to label the level of contami-
nation (e.g., presence or absence).  This policy changes the choice set facing the consumer so that the
number of goods available changes from J to J + K.  The consumer now faces new opportunities to
reduce total exposure to a contaminant.  Assuming that she is aware of them, her perception of the health
effects of her first period choices, h(A N, m), will change to hN.  Again, this change in perception may be I213
characterized by a learning process, controlling for awareness.  If learning is perfect and no unintentional
errors are made, the value of the labeling policy is the amount of compensation that equates utility with
and without the J + K products, given the change in perception of the health effects.  If errors are made,
the information value declines by the disutility from unanticipated health effects and mitigation expenses.
Finally, suppose that a food safety policy provided information only on the health effects of the
contaminant.  The effect would again be expressed in terms of the health effects function, h(A N, m). I
However, in this case, the change in the perception would occur by changing the perception of both
health status and mitigation.  The value of this information is characterized by examining the avoidance
of purchase errors.  In other words, without the information, the consumer would choose period one
purchases as if health effects are h and mitigation is m, when in fact health effects are hN and mN.  With
the information, the perception of h and m are changed and purchase errors are reduced.  However, note
that the consumer incurs costs in order to avoid the errors.  She must avoid the product or avert exposure.
This differs from the situation where the policy involves reducing marginal product contamination where
no added costs are incurred.  Thus, the amount of compensation that offsets the utility gained from
avoided errors, minus the disutility of the cost of avoiding errors,  measures the value of the information.
Note in most of the cases examined here, consumers may take actions that could substantially affect
their food purchases.  Because of the potentially large impacts on producers, it is likely that producers
and other firms would likely respond, thus creating a different opportunity set for consumers than the
ones described here.  This may be an important consideration in benefit estimation, especially if con-
sumers anticipate such responses.
Implications for Empirical Estimation
Empirical measures of the consumer benefits of food safety regulations could include cost of illness,
contingent valuation methods, hedonics, and averting expenditures.  The model above has implications
for determining the applicability of each of these methods under different policy scenarios.
Cost of illness studies (e.g., Roberts 1989) generally include estimates of the opportunity cost of lost
labor time and mitigation expenses.  This approach has the advantage of capturing many aspects of the
disutility associated with the consumer errors that occur when consumers are completely ignorant of food
contamination problems.  However, as the model developed above shows, when measures are already
being taken by consumers to reduce exposure or the methods taken are ineffective, cost of illness
methods will incorrectly estimate consumer benefits when a policy change involves saving of avoiding
and averting costs.  In addition, some consumers will not directly bear many of the costs of illness.
Contingent valuation methods ask respondents to directly value a policy scenario.  The design of the
scenario needs to take into account all the different ways that consumers might respond to a food
contamination problem.  How they respond will depend on their perceptions of  marginal product con-
tamination, methods for reducing contamination, health effects of total exposure, mitigation costs, and
prices with and without the policy scenario.  Respondents will vary in terms of susceptibility and the
extent to which they bear the costs of mitigation.  They may also vary in terms of their expectations of
what are realistic scenarios about government and producer behavior.  Although we can describe
scenarios and provide information about some of these variables, we cannot be certain that respondents
will take the information at face value.  Moreover, respondents may ascribe other consequences to their
food purchases such as improved environmental quality, animal welfare, or worker safety, and thus
evaluate the characteristics of goods differently than expected.  This is especially likely if consumers
associate the policy scenario with changes in production practices that have well-known external effects.
Respondents may also value a government program because it reduces illness among others today and
in the future, and thus they may report purchase changes that in reality they would not make, but that
they think might encourage adoption of the policy.  Empirical evidence suggests that some of these214
values could be important.  For example, Eom 1994, Buzby et al. 1995, and van Ravenswaay and Hoehn
1991a find willingness to pay for reduced pesticide residues is only partially explained by perceived risk
reduction.
Hedonic methods are unlikely to capture all the behavioral responses to food contamination.  It is
difficult to determine how objective product characteristics relate to the actual perceptions of consumers.
Such methods are most useful when product characteristics are easily understood by consumers, and
when brand switching is both possible and a low cost method for consumers to avoid exposure to a
contaminant.  However, few “safety” brands are available to consumers.  Furthermore, the brands avail-
able often have many attributes that are difficult to discern.  For example, consumers might pay a
premium for organic food to avoid pesticide residues, but it is difficult to determine whether the reason
is because of food safety concerns or other concerns (e.g., environmental).
Averting expenditure methods capture only one of the possible consumer responses to food
contamination.  In some of the policy scenarios, this consumer response is not possible.  However, this
method is potentially useful when averting is a common method for consumers to reduce exposure.  As
with other methods, however, it is necessary to account for consumers’ understanding of the actual effect
of their actions.
Conclusion
The literature on food safety has identified at least four different ways that consumers may respond
to food safety problems.  These responses depend on consumers’ knowledge of four different aspects
of food contamination problems.  Our model of consumer choice incorporates the different ways that
consumers can respond to contamination.  Implications for the benefits of several food safety policies
were developed based on different assumptions about consumers’ knowledge.  Different methods of
estimating benefits were shown to capture only some of the ways consumers might respond to food
contamination.  Accounting for consumers’ information states was found to be a problem for all the pos-
sible methods, but the difficulties are different in each case.
Note
Eileen O. van Ravenswaay and John P. Hoehn are Professors in the Department of Agricultural 1
Economics, Michigan State University.
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